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Abstract: We examine the effect of a permanent change to a country 
corporate income repatriation tax system on corporate financial policies. In 
2009, Japan and the United Kingdom switched from a worldwide system to a 
territorial system for the taxation of repatriated foreign earnings, effectively 
reducing the tax liabilities of most multinational firms when repatriating 
earnings. We find that after the change firms accumulate less cash, pay out 
larger amounts through dividends and share repurchases, and invest less 
abroad. We do not find that the tax system change has significantly affected 
domestic investments even when controlling for capital constraints. 
The system under which countries levy taxes on foreign profits 
repatriated to the domestic headquarters of multinational corporations 
recently has been the subject of a heated debate among policy makers 
and corporate lobbyists, due in part to its significant implications on 
the level of tax receipts.1 Recent studies on a temporary change in the 
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earnings repatriation tax in the United States (Dharmapala, Foley, and 
Forbes 2011; Faulkender and Petersen 2012) show that these tax 
systems also affect corporate financial policies. In this study we 
analyze for the first time the implication of a permanent exogenous 
change in the taxation system of repatriated earnings on an array of 
financial policies. Specifically, we investigate the change from a 
worldwide repatriation tax system to a territorial system that took 
effect concurrently in the United Kingdom and Japan in 2009. This 
permanent change provides a unique opportunity to test the long-
lasting effects of a territorial tax system reform not only on corporate 
policies that are highly flexible, such as cash holdings and share 
repurchases, but also on those policies, such as dividend payments 
and corporate investments, which require a longer time to adjust to an 
exogenous shock. 
Of the two systems that regulate the taxation of foreign 
earnings repatriated to the domestic headquarters of multinational 
firms most countries adopt a territorial system. Under this system, the 
parent country levies taxes only on corporate profits earned at home. 
Foreign subsidiaries' repatriated profits as intrafirm dividends are 
exempt.2 Under the worldwide system, used by the United States and 
a minority of other countries, the domestic country can instead levy 
corporate taxes on repatriated profits earned abroad. If the foreign 
corporate tax rate is smaller than the domestic corporate tax rate, a 
firm pays taxes to the foreign country on subsidiary income and then 
pays the remaining difference to the parent country upon repatriation 
of the profits. If, instead, the foreign tax rate is larger than the 
domestic tax rate, a firm pays taxes to the foreign country on 
subsidiary income and then receives a foreign tax credit on the 
difference by the parent country (Graham 2008) upon repatriation of 
the profits.3 
The repatriation tax system adopted by a country is likely to 
have significant implications on the level of domestic and foreign 
corporate investments and corporate payout policy. Under the 
worldwide system, corporations can defer taxations on foreign 
earnings until the cash is repatriated back to the domestic country. As 
long as earnings remain abroad, these companies can effectively avoid 
domestic taxation of foreign income in a way similar to that of firms 
residing in territorial system countries (Markle 2013). The ability of 
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firms residing in worldwide systems to indefinitely postpone cash 
domestic income taxes on foreign earnings is usually paired by 
accounting rules that allow corporations to also avoid financial 
accounting income tax expenses (Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 2011). 
Therefore, the worldwide system has the net effect of discouraging the 
transfer of earnings from a foreign subsidiary to the domestic parent, 
especially when the domestic country, as the United States or Japan, 
has a high corporate tax rate (Altshuler and Grubert 2002). Foley et al. 
(2007) find that U.S. firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold more 
cash overall. 
Our study exploits the recent permanent change in the 
repatriation tax system in the United Kingdom and Japan. Both the 
United Kingdom and Japan switched from a worldwide to a territorial 
system at the beginning of 2009. In early December 2008, Japan 
issued a tax reform package that was implemented the following year. 
The package included a 95% foreign dividend tax exemption for 
foreign dividends received by Japanese corporations from foreign 
subsidiaries. The territorial tax system proposal was intended to 
promote repatriation of foreign earnings to Japan and to encourage 
Japanese firms to increase domestic investments. To limit further 
reduction in corporate tax income, Japan also enacted other transfer 
pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules to limit the use of debt 
by foreign subsidiaries (Landau et al. 2009).4 
The U.K. government released a new rule for the full tax 
exemption of repatriated foreign subsidiary earnings on December 9, 
2008, which was then implemented in 2009. The main goal of the U.K. 
Treasury was to improve Britain's reputation as an attractive business 
location and prevent U.K. multinationals to relocate abroad. 
Concurrently to the territorial tax system reform, the U.K. 
implemented antiavoidance measures and thin capitalization rules 
similar to Japan.5 In addition to the long-term effects that we study in 
this paper, the territorial tax system reform had the short-term effect 
to encourage some of the firms that moved their fiscal headquarters 
abroad to move back to the United Kingdom. Two of twenty-two U.K. 
firms that moved their headquarters abroad in the few years before 
the reform announced that they were considering to move back to the 
U.K. after the implementation of the territorial tax system.6 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol 28, No. 8 (August 2015): pg. 2250-2280. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Oxford University Press. 
4 
 
It is important to notice that during the worldwide system 
period accounting rules such as IAS 12 (analogous to U.S. GAAP APB 
23) allowed British and Japanese multinational firms to avoid 
accounting recording of income tax expense related to foreign earnings 
on their consolidated financial statements. Therefore, avoiding the 
repatriation of foreign earnings not only permitted avoidance of cash 
income taxes but also of financial accounting tax expenses. 
This study examines for the first time the corporate financial 
policy implications of a permanent change in a country income 
repatriation tax system. Previous studies have been confined to the 
analysis of U.S. samples focusing on a single tax system and a single 
financial policy decision, such as cash holdings or foreign acquisitions 
(e.g., Foley et al. 2007; Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi Forthcoming), or a 
temporary change in income repatriation taxation, such as the 2004 
American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA), also known as the Homeland 
Investment Act (Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 2011; Faulkender and 
Petersen 2012). Our examination of a permanent change to the 
repatriation tax system provides a unique opportunity to analyze how 
different is the corporate response to a lasting reform versus a 
temporary one for corporate financial policies that are less time 
variant, such as dividend payments and corporte investments. 
In this study we specifically examine if the change in the 
repatriation tax system significantly affects the level of corporate cash 
holdings, the amount of dividends paid and shares repurchased by the 
parent company, and the amount of domestic and foreign capital 
expenditures. We find that Japanese and U.K. multinationals 
accumulate less cash overall, invest less abroad, and distribute more 
cash to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases after 
the adoption of the territorial system in 2009. Our paper is the first to 
analyze the impact of a change in repatriation taxes on foreign capital 
expenditures and to show that, everything else constant, a shift to a 
territorial system reduces foreign investments. Our results, however, 
do not show that the change in the repatriation tax system has a 
significant effect on the level of domestic corporate investments even 
when we control for the firm's availability of capital. Our results on 
cash holdings, payout policy, and foreign investments also have strong 
economic significance. For a multinational firm with average assets in 
our sample, a change in the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage 
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coefficient from its 2006–2008 mean value of −0.0030 to zero during 
the 2009–2011 territorial system period causes a drop in multinational 
firms' cash holdings ranging from $43 to $64 million, an increase in 
dividends between $51 and $60 million, an increase in total net 
payouts between $64 and $69 million, and a decrease in foreign 
capital expenditures between $14 and $18 million depending on the 
multivariate specification (firm fixed effects or industry and year fixed 
effects), everything else constant. The results of this study show that, 
unlike the U.S. temporary tax holiday in 2004 (Dharmapala, Foley, and 
Forbes 2011), a permanent change of the repatriation tax system has 
a larger impact on dividends than on share repurchases. 
The findings of this study are particularly relevant given the 
policy debate in the United States about a possible modification of the 
worldwide system or a possible switch to a territorial system in the 
same guise of Japan and the United Kingdom. While an analysis of the 
effect of this change on government tax receipts is outside of the 
scope of this paper, our study shows the strong impact that this policy 
change is likely to have on corporate financial policies of U.S. 
multinational firms. 
Even though the shift from a worldwide system to a territorial 
system in both the United Kingdom and Japan took place during the 
great recession period, a comparison between the change in the 
number, operating performance, and domestic investments of 
multinational and domestic firms dispels concerns about a possible 
causation between specific changes in multinational firms and the 
following tax reform. Despite the fact that one of the main goals of the 
British reform was to create an incentive for U.K. multinational firms to 
maintain their headquarters in Great Britain, the number of publicly 
traded U.K. multinational firms actually increased by 20%, whereas 
the number of domestic firms declined by 0.4% in the three years 
preceding the reform. The trend was similar in Japan, where the 
number of multinational firms increased by 7%, whereas the number 
of domestic firms increased by only 0.6%. The Japanese government 
mentioned the goal of spurring domestic investments as a main 
motivation of the tax reform. However, median domestic investments 
to total assets actually increased by 5.9% for multinational firms, 
while they declined by 4% for domestic firms in the three years before 
the reform. Moreover, whereas all firms experienced a decline in 
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income before the reform due to the recession, domestic firms 
suffered more than multinational firms. The median operating income 
to total assets declined by 8% between 2006 and 2008 for domestic 
firms but only 3% for multinational firms.7 
We control for the potential biasing effect of the recessionary 
years in our sample (2008 and 2009) in several ways. The main 
multivariate regressions include a year indicator variable and several 
firm characteristics that are significantly affected by the business 
cycle. In the robustness section we re-estimate our main multivariate 
tests, excluding the recessionary years. We also implement an 
unreported difference-in-differences estimation in which we compare 
the group of multinational firms affected by the tax change with a 
control group of firms not affected by the change (purely domestic 
firms) before and after the implementation of the territorial system. All 
these tests produce results comparable to those presented in the main 
multivariate analysis section of the paper. As an additional robustness 
test to verify that our results are not influenced by some omitted, 
time-varying country factors, we compare the behavior of firms facing 
a tax cost with firms benefitting from a tax credit upon repatriating 
earnings during the worldwide system period and their reaction to the 
territorial reform. We find that tax credit firms increase their cash 
holdings and decrease payouts after the reform. 
It is important to note that the tax planning implemented by 
many multinational firms to limit taxation of foreign profits might, 
everything else constant, strengthen the effect of a shift from a 
worldwide to a territorial system on corporate financial policies. Firms 
can implement “double Irish” and “Dutch sandwiches” arrangements or 
transfer pricing schemes to significantly reduce their foreign tax 
liabilities. However, these tax planning strategies are mainly intended 
to avoid foreign taxation. If those foreign earnings are repatriated to 
the domestic headquarters, under the worldwide system they would be 
taxed at the domestic tax rate minus any tax paid in the foreign 
subsidiaries. Therefore, these foreign tax avoidance schemes have the 
net effect of increasing the difference between the effective tax rate 
abroad and in the domestic country and providing an even stronger 
motivation for a multinational firms to not repatriate foreign earnings 
to the domestic headquarters under the worldwide system. These 
firms might be likely to implement more radical changes to their 
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corporate financial policies after a territorial tax reform compared with 
firms that do not aggressively implement foreign tax avoidance 
schemes.8 
Even though the territorial tax reform is a large exogenous shift 
in tax policy, multinational corporations have to abide by other tax 
rules that might affect their after-tax earnings. For example, a change 
in controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules or changes in tax treaties 
might partially offset the effect of a territorial tax reform. Although we 
cannot empirically control for changes in CFC rules, we realize that 
they might have the effect of biasing our study against finding 
significant results. 
1. Hypotheses Development 
Multinational firms have to consider several possible alternatives 
on how to best use the profits generated by their foreign subsidiaries. 
Firms can maintain foreign earnings abroad to increase subsidiaries' 
cash holdings; they can use foreign earnings to increase investments 
in the subsidiary countries; or they can repatriate foreign income to 
increase domestic cash holdings, increase corporate payouts, embark 
in new domestic capital investments, or initiate acquisitions. Markle 
(2013) finds that multinational firms subject to territorial tax systems 
repatriate more income to their parent country. Altshuler and Grubert 
(2002) argue that firms residing in worldwide tax system countries 
with high corporate tax rates and with a majority of foreign 
subsidiaries in countries with lower tax rates tend to avoid the high 
taxes on repatriation by keeping foreign earnings abroad. Grubert and 
Mutti (2001) find that firms with manufacturing subsidiaries with 
effective tax rates below 10% repatriate on average only 7% of their 
earnings. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) find that a decline of 
repatriation tax rates of 1% is associated with an increase of 1% in 
intrafirm dividends for U.S. firms. Repatriation taxes can in part 
explain why U.S. firms hold more cash than what is predicted by 
standard firm characteristics (Foley et al. 2007). As documented by 
Foley et al. (2007) for U.S firms, we also expect Japanese and U.K. 
firms to hold a large quantity of cash abroad during the worldwide 
system to avoid taxes upon earnings repatriation. Because the 
territorial system reform effectively eliminates the earnings 
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repatriation tax, we expect the firms in our sample to experience a 
decline in the level of consolidated cash as they repatriate more cash, 
which then can be used for corporate payouts, acquisitions, or 
domestic corporate investments. Therefore, we formulate our first 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation 
tax costs during the worldwide tax system period hold less cash overall 
after the adoption of the territorial tax system. 
Multinational firms can use the repatriated cash to increase 
payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends and share 
repurchases. Blouin and Krull (2009) find that firms that reported 
definite plans to repatriate during the AJCA tax holiday increased share 
repurchases more than did firms that did not repatriate. Dharmapala, 
Foley, and Forbes (2011) also find a significant increase in share 
repurchases but not in dividends during the tax holiday. The lack of 
significant results for dividends might be due to the time persistence of 
dividend policy and the limited length of the tax holiday. Because we 
test a permanent change to earnings repatriation tax policy, we expect 
the reform to also significantly affect the level of dividend payments. 
We state our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation 
tax costs during the worldwide tax system period distribute more cash 
to shareholders by increasing both dividends and share repurchases 
after the adoption of the territorial tax system. 
Desai et al. (2007) find that U.S. companies with attractive 
domestic investment opportunities are more likely to repatriate 
earnings when the trade-off between external financing costs and 
repatriation taxes favor earning repatriation. As a temporary or 
permanent elimination of repatriation taxes effectively lowers the cost 
of internal financing for firms with foreign earnings, it possibly creates 
an incentive to invest more domestically, especially if the firms are 
capital constrained. However, Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) 
show that during the 2004 AJCA tax holiday, U.S. multinational firms 
used the temporary repatriation tax break to repurchase shares rather 
than to invest in new domestic projects. Faulkender and Petersen 
(2012), on the other hand, show that capital-constrained firms did 
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invest more domestically during the tax holiday. We therefore 
conjecture the following. 
Hypothesis 3: Japanese and U.K. capital-constrained firms that 
face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide tax system period 
invest more in new domestic projects after the adoption of the 
territorial tax system. 
The accumulation of cash by foreign subsidiaries encouraged by 
the worldwide tax system can also increase investment activity in the 
subsidiary countries. Firms that might need to repatriate cash to invest 
in domestic projects or other financial activities (e.g., acquisitions) 
might forgo those opportunities and invest more in foreign projects. 
Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi (Forthcoming) show that the lockout cash 
due to the worldwide system increases acquisition activity and capital 
expenditures by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms.9 As 
capital-constrained firms are likely to repatriate more cash to increase 
payouts or invest more domestically when repatriation taxes are 
eliminated (Faulkender and Petersen 2012), their foreign subsidiaries 
will see a decrease in their available cash, possibly forcing them to be 
more selective about their investment opportunities. Our fourth 
hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 4a: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation 
tax costs during the worldwide system period invest less in new 
foreign projects after the adoption of the territorial tax system. 
There also exists the alternative possibility that the territorial 
tax reform could create an incentive for firms to invest more abroad 
due to the removal of repatriation tax costs that would eliminate a 
friction in the reallocation of foreign profits to subsidiaries located in 
different foreign countries. Our alternative fourth hypothesis is as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 4b: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation 
tax costs during the worldwide tax system period invest more in new 
foreign projects after the adoption of the territorial tax system. 
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2. Sample and Univariate Analysis 
2.1 Sample formation and variables 
The initial sample consists of the entire population of Japanese 
and U.K. firms covered by WorldScope from 2006 to 2011. Consistent 
with previous studies, we remove financial firms and utilities. We also 
remove companies for which tax data or other variables used in the 
multivariate analyses are not available. Consistent with Foley et al. 
(2007), our sample includes both multinational and purely domestic 
firms. We categorize firms as multinational if their foreign assets are 
larger than zero.10 During our sample period, the statutory corporate 
tax rate in Japan is 40.7%, which is higher than any other country 
with the exclusions of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait (see Table 
A1). The change from the worldwide system to the territorial system 
has therefore potentially reduced the tax liability of all Japanese 
multinational firms repatriating earnings. The United Kingdom, 
however, has a lower statutory corporate tax rate (30% during the 
2006–2008 worldwide system period). U.K. firms with a majority of 
foreign subsidiary profits in countries with larger corporate tax rates 
enjoyed a tax credit upon the repatriation of foreign profits during the 
worldwide system period, credit that they lost upon the 
implementation of the territorial system in 2009. In this paper we are 
interested in investigating the effect of the change in the repatriation 
tax rule for firms that experienced a tax cost upon repatriation of 
foreign profits during the worldwide system period (all Japanese firms 
and a majority of U.K. firms); therefore, in our main tests we remove 
from our sample 258 firm-year observations of U.K. firms that were 
receiving a foreign repatriation tax credit during the worldwide system 
period.11 Our final sample consists of 8,415 firm-year observations 
(5,338 Japanese and 3,077 U.K.) and 1,976 unique firms. 
The main independent variable of this study is the Income 
Repatriation Tax Advantage. Similar to Foley et al. (2007), for the 
period between 2006 and 2008, we compute the income repatriation 
tax cost by first subtracting foreign taxes from the product of a firm's 
foreign pretax income and its effective domestic tax rate.12 We then 
scale this difference by total firm assets and invert the sign. For the 
period between 2009 and 2011, the value taken by this variable 
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depends on the domestic country of the multinational firms. For U.K. 
firms, the value is set to zero. In Japan instead, to reflect the 95% 
exemption rule, we estimate the tax variable from 2009 to 2011 by 
multiplying the number calculated as in the 2006–2009 period by 0.05. 
We also generate an Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Advantage 
variable. This variable is analogous to the income repatriation tax 
advantage but for substituting the firm's effective domestic tax rate 
with the country (Japan of U.K.) corporate statutory tax rate as 
reported in Table A1. 
The control variables used in the multivariate analysis are firm 
characteristics that the extant literature shows to significantly affect 
cash holdings, payout policy, and corporate investments: Log of Total 
Assets, Consolidated Income/Total Assets, Market-to-Book Value of 
Equity, Standard Deviation of Operating Income, Leverage, Capital 
Expenditures/Total Assets, R&D Expenses/Total Assets, and 
Payout/Total Assets. Worldscope provides all data converted in U.S. 
dollars. As stated above, our main sample includes multinational and 
domestic firms. Even excluding tax considerations, multinational firms 
might hold more cash, because of a longer delay between the receipt 
of cash and its use, and more precautionary cash holdings, because of 
greater overall risk generated by their international operations (Foley 
et al. 2007). Moreover, firms with a larger proportion of income 
generated abroad will proportionally pay fewer dividends if most of the 
foreign income is not repatriated to the domestic headquarters. We 
control for these possible differences with two income variables: 
Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets. The 
dependent variables of the different regression specifications are cash 
holdings, corporate investments, and payout policy variables: 
Cash/Net Assets, Domestic Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, Foreign 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, Dividend Payout Yield, and Net 
Payout Yield. Appendix A describes all the variables used in this study. 
2.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the all variables. We 
provide aggregate statistics for the overall sample along with statistics 
for the Japanese and U.K. subsamples. The Alternative Income 
Repatriation Tax Advantage is more negative than the Income 
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Repatriation Tax Advantage because statutory tax rates are usually 
higher than effective tax rates. While the median of foreign income is 
zero, its average is $96.43 M, which is only slightly lower than the 
average of domestic income ($101.48 M). These results suggest that 
more than half of the sample firms are domestic, but multinational 
firms post a large portion of their earnings abroad. This is more 
pronounced for U.K. firms than for Japanese firms. The mean foreign 
income of U.K. firms is higher than their mean domestic income. U.K. 
firms also have larger market-to-book ratio, higher q, and higher 
foreign capital expenditures than do Japanese firms. Moreover, more 
than half of U.K. firms do not pay dividends or buy back shares.13 In 
the main multivariate analyses, we include a country dummy, and we 
also present the results of regressions estimated by separating U.K. 
and Japanese firms.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents means and medians of firm characteristics for the full 
sample (which includes both multinational and domestic firms), a subsample 
that includes only Japanese firms, and a subsample that includes only U.K. 
firms. The sample period is from 2006–2011 unless otherwise specified in the 
table. The variables are described in Appendix A. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents univariate tests performed on two 
subsamples generated by splitting the sample firm-year observations 
between the worldwide period (2006–2008) and the territorial period 
(2009–2011). The sample for these univariate tests consists only of 
multinational firms. All multinational firms in our sample faced a 
repatriation cost during the worldwide period (i.e., a negative 
repatriation tax advantage). We present the results of t-tests of the 
difference of the means and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney nonparametric 
tests for the dependent variables of the multivariate analysis: 
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Cash/Net Assets, Dividend Payout Yield, and Net Payout Yield (dollar 
amount of dividends plus repurchases less equity issuances/total 
assets), Domestic Capex/Total Assets, and Foreign Capex /Total 
Assets. The tables also present the univariate test for the portion of 
dividend payers. With the exclusion of Cash/Net Assets and Domestic 
Capex/Assets, these univariate tests provide preliminary evidence of 
changes in corporate financial policies resulting from the tax system 
change. The t-tests of the mean show that multinational firms are 
more likely to pay higher dividends and pay out more overall (i.e., 
dividends and repurchases) in the 2009–2011 period when the tax 
cost of repatriating earnings effectively drops to zero for U.K. firms 
and to a minimal amount for Japanese firms. The percentage of 
dividends payers among multinational firms increases significantly 
from about 72% to 89% after the switch to the territorial system. Both 
the t-test of the mean and the Wilcoxon test suggest that domestic 
capital expenditures have not significantly changed after the 
implementation of the territorial system in 2009. Finally, both the t-
test and the Wilcoxon test show that foreign capital expenditures to 
total assets are significantly smaller after the tax system change.  
Table 2. Univariate tests 
 
This table presents univariate statistics for cash, payout, and capital 
expenditure variables that are potentially affected by income repatriation 
taxes. Panel A contrasts the means and medians of these variables during the 
worldwide system period (2006–2008) and during the territorial system 
period (2009–2011). For panel A, we restrict our sample to multinational 
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firms. Panel B contrasts the mean and the median of the difference of each 
variable between its level in 2010 (during the worldwide system period) and 
2007 (during the territorial system period). The last two columns of the panel 
table present the p-values of the t-test of the difference of the means and the  
p-value of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney nonparametric test. 
The univariate test presented in panel B of Table 2 does, 
instead, compare the change in cash levels, payout levels, and capital 
expenditures between 2007 (the penultimate territorial system year) 
and 2010 (the second worldwide system year) for multinational and 
domestic firms. This comparison is particularly useful because 
domestic firms do not face income repatriation taxes and therefore are 
unaffected by the income repatriation tax system change. We define 
domestic firms as those firms with neither foreign assets nor foreign 
income. 
The domestic firm sample used for this comparison is formed by 
domestic firms matched to their corresponding multinational firms in 
2007 by total assets, market-to-book, and industry. We select 
matching domestic firms that have the same industry classification of 
the sample firms and are similar in size (total assets) and market-to-
book ratio in 2007, our first sample year. In the first step of our 
matching procedure, we identify firms (1) with the same two-digit SIC 
code of the sample firms, (2) with a level of total assets between 80% 
and 120% of the sample firm's level, and (3) with a market-to-book 
ratio between 80% and 120% of the sample firm's ratio. If more than 
one firm meets the matching criteria for a single sample firm, we 
choose the one that minimizes the following formula:  
 |𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚| + |𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚|, (1) 
 
where TAmult and TAdom are the total assets for the multinational and 
domestic firms and MBmult and MBdom are their market-to-book ratios. 
If we do not find any firm that meets these criteria, we repeat the 
process looking at firms with the same one-digit SIC code. If this 
search is unsuccessful, we match the firm independently from the SIC 
code. If we still do not find a valid match, we select the firm that 
minimizes formula (1) independently from the industry. 
With the exclusion of Domestic Capex/Assets, these univariate 
tests show that our variables of interest change significantly more for 
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multinational firms. Consistent with our hypotheses, the t-tests of the 
mean and the Wilcoxon parametric tests show that multinational firms 
experience a slight decrease in the mean and a slight increase in the 
median cash levels between 2007 and 2010, whereas domestic firms' 
cash levels increased significantly more. Moreover, multinational firms 
increased dividend and total payouts significantly more than did 
domestic firms between 2007 and 2010. Overall, the results presented 
in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that, after the adoption of the 
territorial tax system of income repatriation, multinational firms are 
more likely to transfer income to their domestic headquarters to pay 
more dividends, buy back shares, and invest domestically rather than 
abroad. On aggregate, the annual amount paid in dividends by 
Japanese and U.K. multinational firms in our sample went from an 
average of $93 billion in the three years preceding the reform to $108 
billion after the reform. Net repurchases increased less drastically from 
$32 to $36 billion. Domestic capital expenditures went from $25 to 
$19 billion, while foreign capital expenditures dropped from $51 to $22 
billion.14 
Figure 1 provides a complementary visual representation of the 
univariate results of Table 2 by illustrating the difference in annual 
median values for the variables of interest between multinational and 
domestic firms.15 While domestic firms hold larger quantities of 
cash/assets than multinational firms across the entire sample period, 
the difference becomes larger during the territorial system period. 
Multinational firms have lower dividend yields than did domestic firms 
during the worldwide system period (2006–2008) but had higher 
yields during the territorial system period (2009–2011). The net 
payout yield graph presents a similar picture. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis of multinational firms increasing 
dividend payments during the territorial system period. As also 
reported earlier, earnings (and as a consequence market value) of 
Japanese and U.K. domestic firms was affected by the financial crisis in 
2007 and the beginning of the recession in 2008 more than were 
earnings of multinational firms. The difference is likely due to the fact 
that their larger size and, for many of them, operations in developing 
countries less affected by the recession allowed multinational firms to 
reduce the negative effect of the recession. This difference can explain 
the larger decline in the difference in payout yields between 
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multinational and domestic firms in 2007 and 2008 in a univariate 
setting.  
Figure 1. 
 
Change in firm characteristics around the reform  
Difference in the annual median cash/assets, dividend yield, net 
payout yield, and domestic capital expenditures/assets between 
multinational and domestic firms. For foreign capital 
expenditures/assets, the figure presents the annual median values for 
multinational firms. 
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The foreign capital expenditures/assets graph shows a marked 
decline in foreign investments following the tax system reform. 
Conversely, a comparison between the median domestic capital 
expenditures/assets of multinational and foreign firms does not 
provide evidence of a defined trend around the territorial tax reform. 
The increase in the difference in domestic investments in 2011 is 
mainly driven by a decline in domestic investments by domestic firms 
in that year. The reason for this decline is not due to the change in 
repatriation tax (the reform did not affect domestic firms) and would 
require an empirical investigation outside of the scope of this paper. 
Relevant to our study is the negligible change in the difference 
between 2008 and 2009. In the multivariate analysis, we control for 
several firm characteristics and industry, year, or firm effects to 
control for a multitude on nontax determinants of payouts and 
investments that can drive some of the changes evidenced by the 
graph before and after the tax reform. 
3. Main Multivariate Analysis 
Our multivariate analysis consists of several regression 
specifications that examine the effect of the change from the 
repatriation worldwide system to the territorial system on the 
decisions by Japanese and U.K. firms about (1) the level of cash 
holdings, (2) payout policy (both dividend payments and share 
repurchases), and (3) the amount of corporate investments abroad 
and in their domestic country. All regressions specifications are fixed 
effects regressions:   
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 , (2) 
 
where yit is one of the corporate financial policy-dependent variables 
listed above, Xit is a vector of the time-varying tax and firm-level 
characteristics listed in the variable section, αc is a country dummy, λj 
are industry fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects, and ϵit is the error 
term. 
The data vary along three dimensions: time, industry, and 
country. The inclusion of two different countries allows us to 
investigate how the tax reform affects financial policies, while 
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controlling for the country variation that is industry and firm specific in 
a way that is not possible in the typical single-country studies. When 
estimating Equation (2), we account for serial correlation by 
estimating clustered (Rogers) standard errors, which are White 
standard errors that account for within-firm correlation. We also 
estimate regression specifications with firm fixed effects in place of 
industry and country effects. Firm effects have the advantage of more 
cleanly identifying within-firms changes due to the reform. This 
advantage is, however, partially offset by the loss of many degrees of 
freedom that, in conjunction with the limited sample period, reduces 
the power of our tests.16 
3.1 Repatriation tax costs and cash 
Table 3 presents the results of fixed effects linear regressions 
with the natural logarithm of cash to net assets as the dependent 
variable. The first three columns present the results for regressions 
estimated on the full sample. In the first and third specification, we 
use Income Repatriation Tax Advantage as the tax variable of interest, 
and in the second specification, we use the AlternativeIncome 
Repatriation Tax Advantage variable. The first two specifications 
include industry and year fixed effects, and the third and fourth 
specifications include firm fixed effects. In the last two columns, we 
present the results of regressions estimated separately for Japanese 
and U.K. firms.  
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Table 3. Cash holdings and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with the 
logarithm of cash divided by net assets as the dependent variable. The first 
four columns present the results for regressions, including all observations. 
The fifth column present results for Japanese firms, whereas the sixth column 
presents results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The 
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values, 
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are 
presented in parentheses. 
All these specifications present a consistent picture. Both 
repatriation tax advantage variable coefficients are negative and 
significant. After 2008, when firms were exempted from taxes upon 
repatriation of income from lower tax rate countries because of the 
switch to a territorial tax system, U.K. and Japanese firms significantly 
accumulated less cash. This result is consistent with our first 
hypothesis and confirms the result obtained by Foley et al. (2007) for 
U.S. corporations. This result also has economic significance. If the 
Income Repatriation Tax Advantage in the first specification goes from 
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its 2006–2008 mean value of −0.0030 to effectively zero during the 
2009–2011, cash holdings for a multinational firms with average 
assets drop $64 M, according to the industry fixed effect specification, 
and $43 M, according to the firm fixed effect specification, everything 
else constant. 
Consistent with previous studies about cash holdings 
determinants (e.g., et al. 1999), larger companies and companies with 
more debt, more capital expenditures, fewer R&D expenses, and larger 
payouts (dividends and share repurchases) hold significantly less cash. 
The positive and significant coefficient of SD of operating income 
suggests that the firms in our sample accumulate more cash when 
faced with more uncertainty, consistent with what Arena and Julio 
(2014) show for U.S. corporations. 
3.2 Repatriation tax cost and corporate payouts 
Cash repatriated to the domestic headquarters might be used by 
corporations to increase corporate payouts. In Table 4 we analyze the 
effect of income repatriation tax costs on dividends; in Table 5 we 
analyze the effect of the tax reform on the net share repurchase yield 
(share repurchase amount minus new share issuance amount dividend 
by market capitalization); and in Table 6 we report the effect of 
income repatriation tax costs on total payouts (dividends and net 
share repurchases). Because of a mass of observations at zero, due to 
numerous firms in the sample that do not pay dividends or repurchase 
shares, we estimate Tobit regressions. Standard firm effects Tobit 
regressions, due to the multitude of firm fixed effects, do not provide 
consistent results because fixed effects cannot be conditioned out of 
the likelihood. Therefore, for the firm fixed effects specifications, we 
use Honoré (1992) semiparametric estimator for fixed effect Tobit 
models known as trimmed least absolute deviation (LAD). The LAD 
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal in firm effects 
specifications.  
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Table 4. Dividend payout yield and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the 
dividend payout yield as the dependent variable. The firm fixed effects 
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's (1992) trimmed 
least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The dividend payout yield is the 
firm's annual dividend payments divided by its year-end market value. The 
first four columns present the results for regressions including all 
observations. The fifth column present results for Japanese firms, while the 
sixth column presents results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in 
Appendix A. The regressions include year, country and industry or firm fixed 
effects. p-values, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of 
errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Net repurchase payout yield and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the 
net repurchase payout yield as the dependent variable. The firm fixed effects 
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's (1992) trimmed 
least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The net repurchase payout yield is 
the firm's annual share repurchase amount minus the share issuance amount 
divided by its year-end market value. The first four columns present the 
results for regressions including all observations. The fifth column present 
results for Japanese firms, while the sixth column presents results for U.K. 
firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The regressions include year, 
country and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values, obtained with standard 
errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Net payout yield and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the 
total payout yield as the dependent variable. The firm fixed effects 
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's (1992) trimmed 
least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The net payout yield is the firm's 
annual dividend payments plus net share repurchase amount minus equity 
issuance, all divided by its year-end market value. The first four columns 
present the results for regressions, including all observations. The fifth 
column present results for Japanese firms, and the sixth column presents 
results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The 
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values, 
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are 
presented in parentheses. 
The results presented in Table 4 show that both proxies for the 
repatriation tax advantage are positive and significantly related to the 
dividend payout yield. The results are also robust to the inclusion of 
firm fixed effects. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the 
exemption from repatriation taxes due to the enactment of the 
territorial system had the significant effect of increasing dividend 
payments by U.K. and Japanese corporations. The coefficient of the 
Income Repatriation Tax Advantage implies a large change in dividend 
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yield after the implementation of the territorial system. If the Income 
Repatriation Tax Advantage in the industry fixed effect specification 
(1) (firm fixed effect specification 3) goes from its 2006–2008 mean 
value of −0.0030 to effectively zero during the 2009–2011, the 
dividend yield increases from 1.67% to 1.93% (from 1.69% to 
1.91%), everything else constant, at the median. This change in yield 
corresponds to an increase of $60 M ($51 M) in dividends for a 
multinational firm with average assets and market-to-book ratio in our 
sample. These results are remarkable considering that both in the 
United Kingdom and in Japan the stock market experienced a 
significant decline in value between 2006 and 2008, followed by a gain 
between 2009 and 2011.17 The slightly lower significance of the 
Income Repatriation Tax Advantage variable coefficient in the U.K.-
only regression can be explained by a larger relative increase in stock 
market returns in the United Kingdom, compared with Japan, between 
2009 and 2006 and by a smaller number of dividend-paying firms in 
any given year in the United Kingdom than in Japan. 
The results of Table 4 differ from what Dharmapala, Foley, and 
Forbes (2011) find for dividend payments. Because of the significant 
lasting consequences that changes in dividend payments have on firm 
value, firms smooth dividends, while exploiting the flexibility of share 
repurchases for fast adjustment in payouts (Skinner (2008)). The 
results of Table 4 show that a permanent exogenous change in the tax 
system has a significant effect on the less flexible dividend policy. 
The control variables have coefficients consistent with the 
findings of previous studies that analyze the determinants of payout 
policy (Grullon et al. (2011); Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)). Larger 
companies, more profitable companies, and companies with lower 
leverage, lower R&D expenses, and less income volatility distribute 
more cash to their shareholders in the form of dividends. 
The results of the net repurchase yield regressions in Table 5 
provide useful complementary information to the results of Table 4. 
For the regressions estimated with the full sample, the Tax Advantage 
coefficients are positive and significant. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the territorial tax reform has increased the level of 
share repurchases as a consequence of reducing the cost of 
repatriating profits to the firm's domestic headquarters. However, the 
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statistical significance of the Tax Advantage coefficients is lower than 
in the dividend regressions. A comparison of the results of Tables 4 
and 5 suggests that the permanent change in the tax code had a more 
significant effect on dividend policy. The results for the U.K. sample 
regression show that the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage 
coefficient is not significant. It is likely that the tax reform did not 
significantly affect share repurchase levels in the United Kingdom due 
to other strict regulations that strongly limit the efficacy of share 
repurchase programs for British firms. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) 
show that, due to several reasons, share repurchase activity by U.K. 
firms is minimal compared with U.S. firms. The Model Code prevents 
U.K. firms from repurchasing shares in the two-month period prior to 
the filing of annual earnings and semiannual earnings and in the one 
month before the release of quarterly results. Moreover, U.K. firms are 
required to cancel all repurchased shares. This rule drastically reduces 
the flexibility of share repurchases in the United Kingdom because it 
prevents the creation of treasury stock (i.e., shares that are 
repurchased but can be reissued without shareholder approval).18 
The results of the net payout yield regressions presented in 
Table 6 are consistent with the results of the dividend and share 
repurchase regressions. The exemption from income repatriation taxes 
also has a positive and significant effect of total net payouts. A change 
of the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage in the industry fixed effect 
specification (1) (firm fixed effect specification 3) from its 2006–2008 
mean value of −0.0030 to zero during the 2009–2011 territorial 
system period causes a 16% (15%) increase in net payout yield from 
1.84% to 2.14% (1.84% to 2.11%), everything else constant. This 
change in yield corresponds to an increase of $69 M ($64 M) in net 
payouts for a multinational firm with average assets and market-to-
book ratio in our sample. The coefficients of control variables have the 
expected sign consistent with the dividend and repurchase regressions 
results of Tables 4 and 5 and previous studies on payout policy. For a 
multinational firm with average assets, the results of the firm fixed 
effect regression suggest that $51 M out of the $64 M increase in 
payouts comes from an increase in dividends. This result provides 
evidence of the stronger effect that the permanent tax reform had on 
dividends than on repurchases. 
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3.3 Repatriation tax cost and corporate investments 
The payout results presented in the previous tables show that 
firms use at least a portion of the cash repatriated to the domestic 
country to increase distributions to shareholders in the form of 
dividends and share repurchases. Some of the repatriated cash also 
could be possibly used to increase domestic investments. We test this 
hypothesis by estimating fixed effects regressions with domestic 
capital expenditures over assets as the dependent variables. 19Table 7 
presents the results. Neither repatriation tax proxy in any of the 
specifications has a significant coefficient, suggesting that after the 
implementation of the territorial system U.K. and Japanese firms do 
not use the additional cash repatriated to their domestic country to 
increase domestic investments. The third specification of Table 7 
includes an interaction variable between the tax advantage variable 
and a measure of capital constraint similar to the one used by 
Faulkender and Petersen (2012). Capital Constrained is defined as the 
percentage of the previous four years in which operating cash flows 
(operating income after tax) were lower than capital expenditures. 
Capital-constrained firms are possibly more likely to increase domestic 
investment instead of increasing payouts when allowed to repatriate 
earnings at no additional tax cost. However, our results are not 
consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable between the tax advantage (alternative tax advantage) 
variable and the capital-constrained variable is not statistically 
significant. The coefficients of the control variables show that smaller 
firms and firms with greater domestic profits, with the exclusion of the 
U.K.-only sample, invest proportionally more in their domestic country.  
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Table 7. Domestic investments and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with domestic 
capital expenditures to total assets as the dependent variable. The first five 
columns present the results for regressions, including all observations. The 
sixth column present results for Japanese firms, and the seventh column 
presents results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The 
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values, 
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are 
presented in parentheses. 
Another possible consequence of repatriating more profits after 
the enactment of the territorial system is a lower likelihood to invest in 
less valuable projects in foreign countries and an overall improvement 
in the allocation of funds across countries. Alternatively, the territorial 
reform might encourage foreign investments due to the removal of the 
repatriation tax that could encourage firms to increase foreign profits 
due to the added ability to employ these profits for domestic uses at 
no additional tax penalty. We investigate these two alternative 
hypotheses by estimating fixed effects Tobit regressions with foreign 
capital expenditures divided by total assets as the dependent variable. 
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As for the payout regressions, we use the Honoré's (1992) LAD 
estimator for the firm fixed effects specifications. Table 8 presents the 
results.  
Table 8. Foreign investments and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with 
foreign capital expenditures to total assets as the dependent variable. The 
firm fixed effects specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's 
(1992) trimmed least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The first four 
columns present the results for regressions including all observations. The 
fifth column present results for Japanese firms, and the sixth column presents 
results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The 
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values, 
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are 
presented in parentheses. 
Both repatriation tax advantage proxies in all specifications have 
negative and significant coefficients consistent with our hypothesis 
that the exemption from repatriation taxes due to the implementation 
of the territorial system has significantly reduced foreign investments. 
The Income Repatriation Tax Advantage also has strong economic 
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significance. A change of the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage 
coefficient from its 2006–2008 mean value of −0.0030 to zero during 
the 2009–2011 territorial system period causes a 9.2% decrease in 
foreign capex/assets in the industry fixed effects specification and a 
7.1% decrease in the firm fixed effects specification, which 
corresponds to a decline of $17.5 M and $13.5 M for a multinational 
firm with average assets depending on the specification, everything 
else constant, at the median. 
Overall, the results of the industry (firm) fixed effects 
regressions with the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage as tax 
variable suggest that for a multinational firm with average assets in 
our sample after the territorial system reform cash holdings decline by 
$64 M ($43 M), and foreign investments decline by about $18 M ($14 
M). Net payouts, on the other hand, increase by $69 M ($64 M), of 
which between $60 M ($51 M) are due to an increase in dividends. 
All in all, the tests discussed in this section show that the switch 
from a worldwide repatriation system to a territorial system had the 
effect of encouraging multinational firms to save more foreign cash by 
cutting foreign investments and to transfer larger quantities of foreign 
cash to their domestic country to increase corporate payouts, but not 
domestic investments. While firms can quickly implement changes in 
their payout policy, they might need a longer time to plan and bring to 
fruition capital investments in the domestic country after a tax law 
change. Another possible reason why our results do not show a rapid 
increase in domestic investments following the tax reform is that, 
contrary to the U.S. temporary tax holiday, Japanese and U.K. firms 
were not required to commit to new domestic investments to 
repatriate earnings without incurring in repatriation taxes. 
4. Robustness tests 
Because during our sample period the United Kingdom has a 
relatively high statutory corporate tax rate (30%–26%), but one that 
is lower than some other countries (see Table A1), a group of U.K. 
firms with a majority of foreign operations in countries with higher tax 
rates benefitted from a tax credit upon repatriation of foreign earnings 
during the worldwide system period.20 This group of firms are likely to 
respond to the territorial tax reform in the opposite way than would 
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firms facing a tax liability upon repatriation during the worldwide 
period. The territorial tax system reform essentially removed the 
repatriation tax credit enjoyed by these firms and therefore eliminated 
an incentive to repatriate profits for domestic uses of cash, such as 
dividends, share repurchases, and domestic investments. This group of 
firms, therefore, allows us to estimate a test in which we can compare 
the behavior of firms facing a tax cost with firms benefitting from a tax 
credit upon repatriating earnings during the worldwide system period 
and how these two groups reacted to the territorial reform. For this 
test, we limit our sample to multinational firms headquartered in the 
United Kingdom. We categorize firms as “Repatriation Tax Credit 
Firms” if the variable Income Repatriation Tax Advantage assumes a 
positive value for at least two of the three years of the worldwide 
system period. To verify if these tax credit firms behave in a different 
way than would firms facing a repatriation tax cost before and after 
the reform, we estimate regressions with the Repatriation Tax Credit 
Firm indicator along with the interaction variable Repatriation Tax 
Credit Firm x Territorial Period, which assumes the value of one for 
repatriation tax credit firm during the 2009–2011 territorial period. 
Table 9 presents the results of these regressions. In the 
regression with cash/assets as the dependent variable, the coefficients 
of the two tax credit indicator variables show that firms enjoying a 
repatriation tax credit during the worldwide period hold significantly 
less cash than do firms facing a repatriation cost, but then they 
increase their cash holdings as they lose the tax credit during the 
territorial period. The dividend yield and payout yield regressions show 
that tax credit firms pay higher dividends during the worldwide period 
and reduce dividends during the territorial period. It is worth noting 
that the magnitude of the coefficients of the two indicators in the cash, 
dividend, and payout regressions have similar size with inverted signs 
suggesting that during the territorial period, after controlling for all 
factors affecting cash and payout policy, there is little difference in 
cash and payout policy between firms facing a cost or enjoying a credit 
during the worldwide system. This result is due to the reform 
effectively eliminating a tax disparity between these two types of 
firms. Consistent with the results of the main multivariate regressions, 
the coefficients of the tax variables are not significant in the domestic 
investment regressions. The Repatriation Tax Credit Firm coefficient in 
the foreign investment regression is negative and significant, 
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suggesting that repatriation tax credit firms invest less abroad during 
the worldwide period. Even though the Repatriation Tax Credit Firm x 
Territorial Period coefficient is not significant, the coefficients of the 
two indicators taken together (=−0.0115+0.0098=−0.0017) suggest 
that the reform has essentially eliminated the effect that the worldwide 
system had on foreign investments.  
Table 9. U.K. tax credit firms 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with 
ln(cash/assets), dividend yield, net repurchase yield, net payout yield, 
domestic capital expenditures/assets, and foreign capital expenditures/assets 
as the dependent variables. The sample consists only of U.K. multinational 
firms. The main explanatory variables are (1) an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm received tax credit upon repatriation during the worldwide 
system period and (2) an interaction variable between the repatriation tax 
credit firm dummy and an indicator variable equal to one for the 2009–2011 
territorial system period. All variables are described in Appendix A. The 
regressions include firm fixed effects. p-values, obtained with standard errors 
corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
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As for most countries around the world, both Japan and the 
United Kingdom experienced a deep recession in 2008 and 2009. As a 
robustness test to control for business cyclicality and the effects of the 
recession, we replicate our multivariate tests, excluding the 
recessionary years' observations. All the tax variable coefficients 
maintain the same sign and are statistically significant (with the 
exception of those for the domestic investments regressions). The 
significance is sometimes at a lower level because of the smaller 
sample size, which reduces the power of our tests. 
In the main regressions discussed in the previous section, we 
control for year and industry effects in most specifications. However, 
there could be specific temporal trends by industry that might affect 
some of our results. To control for this possibility, we re-estimate our 
multivariate tests, including industry x year fixed effects in unreported 
specifications. The coefficients of the Income Repatriation Tax 
Advantage maintain their significance. Overall, this test show that our 
results are robust to the inclusion of annual industry effects.21 
In our multivariate analysis, consistent with the payout 
literature (e.g., Hoberg and Prabhala (2009); Grullon et al. (2011)) 
and corporate practices, we measure payout activity with yield 
variables by dividing dividends, share repurchases, and total net 
payout by firms' market value. However, the market value of many 
companies experienced large fluctuations during our sample period 
due to the recessionary years. To test the robustness of our payout 
results to changes in market value we re-estimate our payout 
regressions by substituting the yield dependent variables with payouts 
divided by total assets. Table 10 presents the results. The significance 
of the tax advantage variables for the different specifications is 
comparable with that obtained from the payout yield regressions 
presented in the main multivariate section.  
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Table 10. Payouts to assets and income repatriation tax cost 
 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with 
dividends to assets, net share repurchases to assets, and net total payouts to 
assets as the dependent variables. All variables are described in Appendix A. 
The regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-
values, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by 
firm, are presented in parentheses. 
5. Conclusions 
Countries rarely make clear-cut changes to their taxation rules. 
In this study we exploit one of those rare opportunities offered by the 
decision of Japan and the United Kingdom in 2009 to switch from a 
worldwide to a territorial system for the taxation of repatriated foreign 
corporate income. We find that this change had broad and significant 
repercussions on corporate financial decisions. 
The switch from a tax credit repatriation system to a territorial 
system in Japan and the United Kingdom offered multinational firms 
residing in these two countries the ability to repatriate foreign income 
at no additional or significantly lower tax costs. Overall, the results of 
this study suggest that the removal of this tax disadvantage when 
repatriating earnings had the effect of encouraging multinational firms 
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to save more cash abroad by cutting foreign investments and to 
transfer larger quantities of foreign cash to the domestic country to 
increase corporate payouts rather than domestic investments. The 
ability to use more cash from the firms' headquarters location for 
payouts had the additional effect of decreasing consolidated cash 
holdings. The results of this paper may assist the decision-making 
process of policy makers in the United States and other countries that 
are currently adopting a worldwide system and are considering a 
change in their tax repatriation rule. In more general terms, this study 
underlines how a permanent change in the corporate tax code can 
have strong, long-standing consequences for corporate financial 
policies that ultimately affect shareholder wealth and the level of 
employment in domestic and foreign countries. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Country corporate tax rate 
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Local corporate tax rate are averaged at the country level and added to the 
statutory country tax rate. Countries are ordered by descending 2006 tax 
rate. Source: KPMG. 
Appendix A 
Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition  
Alternative Income 
Repatriation Tax 
Advantage  
The product of a firm's foreign pretax income and its 
country corporate tax rate minus foreign taxes paid. 
The maximum of this difference or zero is then 
divided by total firm assets and the sign is inverted. 
This variable is set to zero between 2009 and 2011  
Log (Cash/Net Assets)  Natural logarithm of cash plus marketable securities 
divided by total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities  
Capital Constrained  Percentage of the four previous years during which 
the firm had operating cash flows (operating profits 
minus taxes) below capital expenditures  
Capital 
Expenditures/Total 
Assets  
Total capital expenditures divided by total assets  
Dividend Payout Yield  Firm's annual dividend payments divided by its year-
end market value  
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Variable  Definition  
Domestic Capex/Total 
Assets  
Domestic capital expenditures divided by total 
assets  
Domestic Income/Total 
Assets  
Domestic earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by total assets  
Foreign Capex/Total 
Assets  
Foreign capital expenditures divided by total assets  
Foreign Income/Total 
Assets  
Foreign earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets.  
Income Repatriation 
Tax Advantage  
The product of a firm's foreign pre-tax income and 
its effective tax rate minus foreign taxes paid. The 
maximum of this difference or zero is then divided 
by total firm assets and the sign is inverted. . This 
variable is set to zero between 2009 and 2011  
Leverage  (Long-term debt + short-term debt)/total assets  
Log of Total Assets  Natural logarithm of the firm assets  
Net Payout Yield  firm's annual total net payout (dividends plus 
repurchases less equity issuances) divided by its 
year-end market value  
R&D Expenses/Total 
Assets  
Research and Development expenses, set to zero if 
missing, divided by total assets  
Market-to-Book Value 
of Equity  
Ratio of the market value to the book value of a 
firm's equity  
St. Dev. of Operating 
Income  
Standard deviation of the firm's annual operating 
income during the sample period  
Tobin's Q  Total assets plus market value of equity minus book 
value of equity, all divided by total assets  
Total Income/Total 
Assets  
Consolidated earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets  
All the financial statement data used to construct the variables are retrieved 
from Worldscope and expressed in U.S. dollars. 
We wish to thank David Denis (the editor), Randy Heron, 
Brandon Julio, Takeshi Nishikawa, Anthony Pennington-Cross, Sarah 
Peck, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at Marquette 
University, University of Colorado Denver and the FMA 2013 meeting 
for helpful comments and discussions. 
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1 See, for example, “More profits parked offshore,” The Wall Street 
Journal, March 11, 2013, “Corporate taxes, the myths and facts,” The 
Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2012, “Obama vs. Volcker, et al. The 
President's advisers agree with Romney on a territorial tax reform,” 
The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2012, “Why investors can't get 
more cash out of U.S. companies,” The Wall Street Journal, February 
19, 2011, and “Escaping the shakedown,” The Economist, July 4, 
2009. 
2 In some territorial system countries, the exemption is set at 95% 
instead of being full. 
3 The foreign country also levies a withholding tax on dividends 
(earnings) transferred to the parent country. 
4 Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact No. 335. 
5 Houlder, V., “Tax move aims to check business exodus,” Financial 
Times, December 10, 2008. Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact No. 336. 
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6 “WPP, publisher weigh end to tax exile from U.K.,” The Wall Street 
Journal, March 25, 2010. 
7 Source: Thomson Reuters Worldscope. 
8 As stated by the 2013 IMF Fiscal Monitor Report Survey, these tax 
avoidance techniques are implemented by multinational firms in both 
advanced and developing economies. However, the problem is less 
acute in Japan because Tax Heaven Counter Measure Laws effectively 
limit tax avoidance schemes via tax heavens. 
9 Let us consider a Japanese multinational firm with a cost of capital of 
11%. This firm needs to repatriate cash to invest in a project that will 
generate $150 M in cash flows next year and will require an 
investment of $100 M this year (the NPV is therefore $35.1 M). The 
cash could be repatriated from a Dutch subsidiary. The Dutch 
subsidiary also has an investment opportunity that could generate 
$135 M next year and requires a $100 M investment this year (the 
NPV is $21.6 M). In the absence of repatriation taxes, the cash would 
be repatriated to invest in the more lucrative domestic project. Under 
the worldwide tax system, the foreign project would be chosen 
instead. The statutory corporate tax in the Netherlands is 25.5%, 
whereas it is 40.69% in Japan. The 15.19% difference on the $100 M 
would be paid upon repatriation. Therefore, approximately $118 M 
would need to be repatriated to have $100 M after tax to invest in the 
domestic project (118*(1-0.1519) = 100). Effectively, therefore, the 
domestic project requires an investment of $118 M, reducing the NPV 
to $17.1 M, which is lower than the NPV of the foreign project. 
Hartman (1985) argues that under the worldwide system if the after-
tax rate of return abroad is higher (lower) than the domestic net rate 
of return, the firm would invest abroad and repatriate in the following 
period (repatriate immediately and invest domestically). However, if 
there is an expectation of a tax holiday or a territorial tax system 
reform in one of the following periods, the firm is more likely to 
reinvest in foreign projects even when their returns are lower, 
consistent with our hypothesis and numerical example. 
10 Worldscope provides data about foreign assets, foreign capital 
expenditures, foreign income, and foreign income taxes for firms with 
foreign operations. 
11 We include these tax-credit firms in one of our robustness tests. 
12 We calculate the effective domestic tax rate by dividing domestic 
income taxes by pretax domestic income. Foreign taxes include also 
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any possible withholding taxes on dividends (earnings transferred to 
the domestic country) levied by the subsidiary country. 
13 The proportion of U.K. dividend payer to nonpayer in our sample is 
49:51. 
14 We report these aggregate figures purely for illustrative purposes. 
The reported numbers are affected by any change in the number of 
multinational firms over the years and, most of all, changes in firm 
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions during and after the 
recession. 
15 The only exception is the graph of foreign capital expenditures, 
which just reports the multinational firms' annual median values. 
16 In unreported results, we also repeat all of our tests using a 
difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approach, in which we 
compare changes in financial policy variables for a treated group of 
companies that are affected by the tax law change (i.e., multinational 
firms) with a control group of companies that are not affected by the 
tax change (i.e., purely domestic firms). The results are qualitatively 
identical. 
17 We check for the robustness of our results by scaling payouts by 
assets rather than by market values in regressions that are presented 
in Table 10. 
18 Refer to Rau and Vermaelen (2002) for a detailed discussion of U.K. 
regulations on share repurchases. 
19 For the domestic firms in our sample, domestic capital expenditures 
coincide with consolidated capital expenditures. 
20 When we include those firms in our sample, the results do not 
significantly change. These results are available upon request. 
21 The results of these tests are available upon request. 
